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The paper examines the equilibrium relationship between managerial incentives and product market competition 
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reward schemes and managers are privately informed on firms. production technologies, it is showed that a 
competing-contracts effect, at play under high powered incentive schemes (contracts based on firms’ profits), 
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market competition, managerial effort and agency costs thus obtains when contracts are based on firms’ profits. 
Remarkably, whenever competition is strong enough, low powered incentive schemes (contracts based on 
production costs) may survive in equilibrium with detrimental effects on welfare. 
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   1 Introduction
The question of whether competition is conducive to e¢ ciency has been the focus of an intense debate
among economists and policy makers over the last decades. Whereas economic theory convincingly
argues that more competition has bene￿cial e⁄ects on allocative e¢ ciency, much less clear cut re-
sults have been obtained in explaining why, and to what extent, competition drives ￿rms to reduce
costs and enhances productivity growth. In the case of pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms, a well established
tradition argues for a positive relationship between market power and investment in innovation (the
Shumpeterian view). As for managerial ￿rms, instead, the impact of competition on x-e¢ ciency is
complicated by the design of managerial incentives.
As conjectured by Jensen and Meckling (1976), competitive pressure has no direct impact on the
e¢ ciency frontier of managerial ￿rms whenever relative performance contracts are enforceable, so that
internal agency constraints are isolated from competitive forces.1 In real world, however, the idea that
owners are able to exploit yardstick competition, and can achieve full extraction of rents, may be
questioned on several grounds.2 Admittedly, the empirical research has produced little support to the
use of relative performance in managerial contracts (see Murphy, 1999, among many others).
Assuming away the possibility of enforcing relative performance, the interaction between compet-
itive pressure, managerial incentives and contract design is much more subtle. In this regard, one of
the key issues is the understanding of how the appropriation of rents by managers interacts with mar-
ket competition under alternative arrangements governing the distribution of ￿rms￿surplus between
shareholders and managers. This paper provides an analysis of the relationship between managerial
rents, market competition and e¢ ciency by taking a principal-agent perspective. In contrast with
the bulk of the existing literature, though, in our framework managerial contracts are endogenously
1As pointed out by the literature on yardstick competition, owners￿ability to control managerial behavior can be
substantially improved within more competitive environments, provided that managers￿private information displays
common components. In all these circumstances market information wipes out the informational monopoly power that
managers enjoy at the revelation stage in a principal-agent set-up (see Bertoletti and Poletti, 1997, for a clear statement
of this point).
2On the one hand, except than in the case of ￿rms quoted on perfect stock markets, it is not always the case that
market information is readily available and veri￿able by third parties enforcing contracts. On the other hand, somewhat
natural features of imperfectly competitive markets may severely limit owners￿bene￿ts from yardstick competition. See
Bebchuck et al. (2002) for a convincing argument in support of the view that observed managerial rents should suggest
that limited enforceability of e¢ cient contracts is a relevant issue. In the same spirit, Sappington, (2002), argues that,
in regulatory practices such contracts are not often observed.
1chosen by owners among di⁄erent alternatives.
A key feature of the analysis is to start with the de￿nition of a pre-speci￿ed set of contractual
instruments available to owners in order to control managers￿misbehavior. We consider two alternative
remuneration schemes, a cost-based, a direct measure of managerial activity, and a pro￿t-based one, a
measure of market performance. This assumption captures common features of real-world contracting
practices since executives￿compensations are typically based on measures such as accounting pro￿ts
or operation costs. Moreover, it also provides a simple environment to examine the equilibrium
determinants of managerial contracts, their e¢ ciency properties, and the e⁄ects of product market
competition on managerial incentives.
Our analysis is performed in a set-up where two managerial ￿rms, producing di⁄erentiated goods,
compete on a market by setting quantities. Managers, who have private information on ￿rms￿(un-
certain) production technologies, perform an unveri￿able cost-reducing activity and choose quantities;
while owners simultaneously choose contracts from the pre-speci￿ed set of alternative mechanisms. As
we show the selection of the contractual mode a⁄ects the competitive behavior of ￿rms at the market
stage. In turn, the intensity of product market competition shapes the set of equilibrium contracts.
The e⁄ect of competition on managerial incentives depends upon the measure of managerial perfor-
mance (costs, pro￿ts) available to owners. If managerial compensations are conditioned on costs, the
internal agency problem is isolated from the impact of competitive pressure. If, instead, owners condi-
tion transfers on pro￿ts, competition has a direct impact on agency costs. Asymmetric information is
key to these results. First, adverse selection forces owners to grant rents to their managers in order to
induce separation of types. Crucially, this feature allows us to argue that market competition directly
in￿ uences revelation constraints as well as managerial rents under pro￿t-target. Second, because of
the moral-hazard issue, the two kinds of contracts have di⁄erent e⁄ects on allocative e¢ ciency so that
information rents are sensitive to the performance measure used to design incentives. This also allows
us to shed light on the mechanism through which managerial performance is in￿ uenced by competitive
forces.
More generally, our set-up allows us to disentangle the di⁄erences between cost-target and pro￿t-
target contracts as due to the way owners exploit the information disclosed by managers and use it
2to grant rents. The revelation of a low cost state, for instance, provides two bits of information: a
good news concerning productive e¢ ciency and a bad news as for the toughness of market competi-
tors. Cost-target contracts only allow owners to exploit the former piece of information, thus leaving
managers with informational monopoly power at the revelation stage. Contracts contingent on mar-
ket performance, instead, provide ￿ exibility to the owners, in that managerial rewards are reactive
to changes in the underlying competitive environment. Despite pro￿t-target contracts display better
informative properties relative to cost-target ones, we show that this latter regime can emerge in equi-
librium, especially in very competitive environments. From a normative perspective, the e¢ ciency
properties of these regimes are characterized, and it is demonstrated that cost-based contracts are
detrimental both to social welfare and consumers.
As for the impact of competitive pressure on both managerial e⁄ort and agency costs, beyond a
scale e⁄ect driving managers to reduce e⁄ort as competition becomes more ￿erce, we show that an
opposite pure agency e⁄ect is at play directly through information rents. The key idea is that, under
pro￿t-based schemes, more ￿erce competition reduces these rents by relaxing the rent-extraction-
e¢ ciency trade-o⁄. Each owner can thus shift up the allocation assigned to ine¢ cient types towards
its ￿rst-best level, thereby alleviating x-ine¢ ciency. Under mild assumptions, this e⁄ect prevails over
the scale e⁄ect and calls for a positive impact of product market competition on managerial e⁄ort.
An inverted-U shaped relationship between e⁄ort, agency costs and market competition then obtains
as a consequence of the tension between these two e⁄ects. Interestingly, such a non-linear relationship
captures the evidence provided in a recent contribution by Aghion et al. (2005) studying a panel of
U. K. industries during the period of liberalization reforms undertaken over the 1970s and 1980s.
The idea that competition is conducive to e¢ ciency has been a common belief among economists
and men of a⁄air since long time. However, despite the empirical work has produced mild evidence
supporting this conjecture3, the theoretical literature has often expressed contrasting views. In a
seminal article, Hart (1983) shows that competition has bene￿cial e⁄ects on managerial slack if man-
agers are privately informed on a common technological shock and the measure of entrepreneurial
￿rms in the economy is large enough.4 Scharfstein (1988) and Hermalin (1992), prove that this result
3See Aghion et al. (2005), Gald￿n-SÆnchez and Schmitz (2002) and Nickell (1996) among many others.
4Hart￿ s results are derived, however, in an economy where managerial and entrepreneurial ￿rms compete. Within this
3hinges on the very large degree of managers￿risk aversion and that, with a more standard preference
structure, the opposite relation between incentives and competition obtains. Subsequently, Martin
(1993) studied a Cournot oligopoly with information asymmetries and showed that, under ex-post
cost observability, a measure of x-ine¢ ciency increases as market concentration falls. Bertoletti and
Poletti (1997), pointed out that this result does not rely on a genuine e⁄ect of market competition
on managerial incentives. The reason being that the impact of competition on productive e¢ ciency
in Martin￿ s model is driven by a scale e⁄ect at play only via marginal revenues.5
The positive impact of competition on managerial e⁄ort has been showed by a number of works
based on ￿nancial market imperfections. The main idea (see Schmidt, 1997, and Stennek, 2000) is
that if owners face limited liability constraints and may not be able to pay out managers in some
states of the world, competition reduces managerial slack simply because managers will be willing to
reduce the probability of such states. Notice that, di⁄erently from the results that we obtain in the
paper, the e⁄ectiveness of this mechanism is driven only by the impact of competition on managers￿
participation constraints. Finally, a similar mechanism is at play in a pure moral hazard setting with
free entry. Raith (2003), for instance, shows that greater product market competition, as a result of
increased product substitutability, unambiguously drives principals to provide agents with stronger
incentives towards cost reduction.
Our contribution adds to previous literature in three respects. First, instead of taking the contract-
ing technology as exogenously given, we model the choice of the contractual modes as an endogenous
variable controlled by ￿rms￿owners. This allows us to carefully investigate the relationship between
product market competition, constrained e¢ ciency and equilibrium managerial contracts. It turns out
that when products are relatively close substitutes, owners may end up playing cost-based schemes and
implement a market allocation sub-optimal relative to that achieved under pro￿t-target. This result
shows that, in a principal-agent set-up where owners may choose among di⁄erent types of contracts,
￿rms￿equilibrium behavior may not achieve constrained e¢ ciency. As a consequence, the e⁄ect of
competition on the internal organization of ￿rms should be carefully assessed from a public policy
setting competition makes the performances of di⁄erent ￿rms interdependent via prices, thereby reducing managerial
slack.
5They argue that, with un-correlated managers￿types, revelation constraints are isolated from competitive pressure.
With common components and under ex-post market variables veri￿ability, they show that ￿rst-best productive e¢ ciency
is restored, see also Riordan and Sappington, (1988), and CrØmer and McLean, (1988).
4perspective. Second, we point out that when managerial rewards are conditioned on pro￿ts, a pure
agency e⁄ect, may drive product market competition to have a positive impact on managerial e⁄ort.
In contrast to the previous literature, mainly focused on participation constraints, this e⁄ect is at
play only through revelation constraints introduced by adverse selection. Finally, having showed that
endogenous contracting may lead to multiple equilibria, we have provided a rationale for why agency
theory is not at odds with the observed heterogeneity of governance arrangements in managerial ￿rms
and, more fundamentally, with the survival of incentive schemes not sensitive to ￿rm￿ s performance
(Murphy, 1999).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
brie￿ y describes the complete information benchmark. Section 4 studies the model under asymmetric
information and characterizes the equilibrium of the contracting stage for the case of perfect correlation
among managers￿types. In Section 5 we study the implication of equilibrium contracts for the impact
of increased competitive pressure on x-e¢ ciency. Section 6 extends the results of the paper to a more
general class of economies. Finally, Section 7 concludes. All proves are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Model
Players and Environment Consider an industry where two managerial ￿rms, producing di⁄erenti-
ated goods, compete by setting quantities. Each ￿rm is run by a manager who is privately informed
about the ￿rm￿ s production technology. The (inverse) demand is symmetric for both markets with
pi(qi;qj) = A ￿ qi ￿ bqj, where qi is the quantity produced of the i-th product, pi is the ￿nal price
level charged for this product, b 2 [0;1] is the degree of products￿substitutability and A denotes an
exogenous measure of consumers￿willingness to pay. Firms￿production technology are linear and
de￿ned by the cost function Ci(qi;~ ￿;ei) = (~ ￿ ￿ ei)qi, where ~ ￿ denotes the realization of a (common)
random variable distributed on a discrete support, ￿ ￿ f￿L;￿Hg, with Pr(~ ￿ = ￿H) = ￿. One can
think of this variable as being a shock to the cost of an essential raw input used to produce both ￿nal
goods.6 The variable ei measures an unveri￿able cost-reducing activity (e⁄ort) performed by the i-th
6We shall discuss in a concluding section that the analysis extends immediately to an environment with large enough
(positive) correlation. The proof is based on a continuity argument.
5manager. Managerial activity is assumed to be costly and   (ei) = e2
i=2 denotes the e⁄ort disutility
for every i-th manger. Managers are risk neutral and their preferences are represented by the utility
function u(wi;ei) = wi￿  (ei), where wi denotes a monetary transfer (wage) paid-out by the i-th risk
neutral ￿rm owner. Marginal costs of the i-th ￿rm are de￿ned by ci = ￿ ￿ei, while ￿i = pi(qi;qj)￿ci
denotes net, average pro￿ts.
Merely for expositional simplicity we normalize ￿H ￿ ￿L = 1; furthermore, to guarantee interior
solutions of the optimization programs displayed below, we assume A > ￿H > ￿L > 1 + 3(1 ￿ ￿)=￿.
As we shall explain, this restriction captures the idea that e⁄ort by high-cost (ine¢ cient) managers,
as well as their produced output, must be worthwhile to owners. Alternatively, this condition can be
expressed as ￿ > " with " being positive and chosen so as to guarantee that both e⁄orts and outputs
are positive in equilibrium. In order to make the problem interesting, in the rest of the analysis we
only consider this case. Finally, as usual, sometimes we shall refer to ￿ as to the managers￿type.
Contract Space Each ￿rm is represented by an exclusive, principal-agent relationship. Owners
(principals) hire managers before production occurs but after uncertainty is resolved. They have the
full bargaining power and o⁄er contracts through a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er. This assumption captures
the idea that managerial services are supplied in a competitive fashion and that managers are selected
from a very large population of agents. We invoke the Revelation Principle7 in de￿ning the set of
incentive feasible allocations, so that each owner-manager pair plays a communication game before the
competitive stage. Therefore, for any given direct, truthful, revelation mechanism chosen by the i-th
owner, the i-th manager must report a message, mi 2 ￿, about the state of the production technology.
Two kinds of managerial contracts are studied: (i) a pro￿t-based scheme, referred to as pro￿t-target;
and (ii) a cost-based one, labeled cost-target. The reason why we restrict owners￿strategies to this
alternatives relies on two simple arguments. In the ￿rst place, our contribution provides a ￿rst step
in extending previous literature where either pro￿t-target (Hart, 1983) or cost-target (Martin, 1993,
Schmidt, 1997, Stennek, 2000, among others) have been studied in isolation. Secondly, accounting
pro￿ts and operation costs are the two natural performance measures (Murphy, 1999) upon which
CEO￿ s compensation packages are conditioned.
7See La⁄ont and Martimort (2002, Ch. 2), and Martimort (1996) among others.
6Let S ￿ fC
p
i ,Cc
ig be the space of deterministic, truthful revelation mechanisms for this simple
economy. In the following we denote by C
p
i ￿ f￿i(mi);qi(mi);wi(mi)gmi2￿ a pro￿t-target mechanism
specifying, for each message mi, an average pro￿t-target8, ￿i(mi), an output level, qi(mi), and a
monetary transfer, wi(mi). And by Cc
i ￿ fci(mi);qi(mi);wi(mi)gmi2￿ a cost-target contract9 dictating,
for each message mi, an average cost-target, ci(mi), in addition to an output level and a monetary
transfer de￿ned as above. Of course, to rule out the possibility of renegotiation issues (see Caillaud,
Jullien and Picard, 1995), owners can fully commit to any mechanism belonging to S.
It is worthwhile stressing that the possibility of enforcing contracts contingent on both costs and
pro￿ts is also ruled out. The reason for imposing such an assumption is twofold: (i) were this type
of contracts allowed, owners could achieve full-extraction10, a feature which seems to be in sharp
contrast with the evidence showing that managers do enjoy positive rents (Murphy, 1999); (ii) seldom
in real-life contracts display this feature, they rather appear simple and are usually contingent only
upon one measure of managerial performance. Perhaps, a simple explanation for this evidence is that
verifying at the same time operation costs and accounting pro￿ts can be very expensive in practice
because of enforcement and monitoring costs.
Observe also that, without loss of generality, we explicitly rule out the possibility of having con-
tracts contingent only on sales. Indeed in our setting such contracts would always be dominated by
every mechanism belonging to S (see Martimort and Piccolo, 2006).11
Equilibrium Concept Following the notation introduced by Prat and Rustichini (2005), in what
follows we shall analyze a game played through agents (GPTA), G, where the set of players is de￿ned
by the two owner-manager pairs composing the competing hierarchies.12 The owners￿action space,
8Typically, this remuneration scheme can be implemented by a menu of linear contracts of the form w = B+￿(￿
R￿￿
￿),
where B is a ￿xed payment, ￿ measures the incentive power of the scheme, ￿
R denotes the realized pro￿t level, whereas
￿
￿ is the expected (announced) pro￿t level.
9This type of contract follows the same logic as the pure cost of service introduced by La⁄ont and Tirole (1986). In




realized marginal costs, while c
￿ is the announced one.
10We thank Gregory Pavlov and Michael Whinston for pointing this out. It is worth noticing, however, that contracts
based on both costs and pro￿ts would not yield ￿rst-best allocations under imperfect correlation of types and managers￿
limited liability.
11The idea is simple. Every allocation implemented with a contract specifying only sales, i.e., fqi(￿);wi(￿)g￿2￿, can
always be replicated by a more complete mechanism dictating also a cost or a pro￿t target beyond sales and transfers.
12It is worth noticing, however, that while in Prat and Rustichini (2005) principals only set transfers, in our analysis
they choose among di⁄erent mechanisms due to adverse selection.
7S, is the set of available mechanisms de￿ned above; while the managers￿action space, M ￿ ￿￿fa;rg,
entails a message on the realization of the production technology, mi 2 ￿, and the decision of accepting,
a, or refusing, r, the contract o⁄er. The extensive form game is as follows. First, principals choose
their mechanisms simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Second, agents deliver messages and accept
or refuse contracts. Finally, without observing contract in the rival hierarchy, managers exert e⁄ort and
announce quantities. Throughout we shall assume that contracts between principals and agents are
unobservable to other players in the game. Such an assumption rules out issues on the commitment
value of managerial contracts which are not addressed in the paper.13 Assuming that managerial
contracts are public information seems in fact to be often inappropriate. As argued by Katz (1991),
the contract between an executive and his ￿rm may largely be an implicit, self enforcing one. Although
often legislations do require ￿rms to announce the amount of compensation paid to their top managers,
observing the rule by which these compensation are calculated may be a very di¢ cult task. In addition,
in the example at hand renegotiation issues also shed doubts on how e⁄ective is the commitment value
of contracts￿observability.14
We restrict attention to pure-strategy (Nash) equilibria.15 For any given realization of ￿rms￿
production technology, a pure strategy for the i-th manager of type ￿, is a decision rule mapping
￿ into M, i.e., ￿ : ￿ ! M; while a pure strategy for the i-th owner is just an element of the contract








j (￿);￿), with t;t0 2 fc;pg, be the expected pro￿t
of the i-th owner from choosing the mechanism Ct
i when managers reveal truthfully their types and
the j-th owner chooses the mechanism Ct0
j , with ￿(:) = (pi(qi(￿);qj(￿)) ￿ (￿ ￿ ei(￿)))qi(￿) ￿ wi(￿).
Moreover ui(wt
i(mi);et
i(mi);mj;￿) denotes the type ￿ utility of the i-th manager delivering a message
mi at the revelation stage, when the mechanism Ct
i is implemented. Notice that under pro￿t-target this
function may well depend on the j-th manager￿ s message. Moreover, let ￿
t0;t
i denote the set of incentive
13These issues are typically addressed by setting up a two-stage game where, in the ￿rst place, owners commit to a
contractual scheme and then, in the second stage, managers compete either in quantities or prices after having observed
the contracts enforced within competing hierarchies, see Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) among many
others.
14In this respect, Katz (1991) argues that ￿it may be well too costly to write and enforce a contract among the agent
and other players in the game, that says there is no other contract between the agent and his principal; monitoring all
possible payments made between the agent and his principal in response to the agent￿ s behavior in one transaction may
be impossible...￿.
15Indeed, in order to take into account mixed strategies one should consider owners mixing among di⁄erent types of
mechanisms (see for instance Bontems and Bourgeon, 2000). However, this scenario will not be studied for the same
reason why relative performance have been ruled out of our analysis.
8feasible allocations for the i-th manager under the t0-th contract whenever the j-th owner o⁄ers the
t-th contract to her manger. A (pure-strategy) truthful information revelation Nash equilibrium of G is
a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which players use pure-strategies, managers reveal truthfully their
type and accept the contracts o⁄ered by owners. It is worthwhile observing that, in the following, we
will consider Nash equilibria implementation, meaning that each manager must have an incentive to
truthfully reveal his type, provided that his competitor does the same (Myerson, 1982, and Martimort,
1996, among others). The de￿nition below states formally the equilibrium concept used to solve the
game.
De￿nition 1 For every ￿ 2 ￿, a (pure-strategy) truthful information revelation Nash equilibrium
of the game G is a pair of contracts (Ct0
j ;Ct
i) 2 S2 and a pair of messages and acceptance rules (￿i;￿j) 2
￿2 ￿fa;rg

















and ￿i = ￿j = (￿;a),
such that:












































































Timing The overall sequence of events is as follows:
9- T=1, Uncertainty about costs is realized and only managers observe it.
- T=2, Owners simultaneously o⁄er contracts to their managers. If an o⁄er is rejected, both the
parties composing a vertical hierarchy enjoy their outside option normalized to zero.
- T=3, If contracts are accepted, the communication game takes place. Managers deliver messages,
exert e⁄ort and simultaneously announce the quantities speci￿ed in their contracts without observing
the contract implemented within the competing organization.
- T=4, Payments are made according to the realization of contracted variables.
3 The Complete Information Benchmark
This section analyzes the model under complete information. In this setting, one can show that
owners implement the complete information allocation simply by selling out ￿rms to managers. Let
ui(￿) = (pi(qi(￿);qj(￿)) ￿ (￿ ￿ ei))qi(￿) ￿  (ei) ￿ Fi(￿) de￿ne the type-contingent utility of the i-th






f(pi(qi(￿);qj(￿)) ￿ (￿ ￿ ei))qi(￿) ￿   (ei) ￿ Fi(￿)g ￿ 0
￿
;
be the set allocations such that each i-th manager of type ￿ is willing to accept the contract. The i-th
owner must then design a contract, fqi(￿);Fi(￿)g￿2￿, so to maximize Fi(￿) subject to (Fi(￿);qi(￿)) 2
B￿;i and qi(￿) ￿ 0 for all ￿. As standard, in an interior solution ￿rst-order necessary conditions equate
marginal revenues to marginal costs, i.e., A ￿ 2qi(￿) ￿ bqj(￿) = ￿ ￿ ei(￿); and qi(￿) = ei(￿) for all ￿.
At a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the market game one has:




In order to guarantee interior solutions in the following we assume A 2 (￿H;2￿L), with ￿H < 2￿L
since ￿L > 1. Next lemma shows that the above allocation is achieved either under cost-target or
under pro￿t-target contracts. As a result, under complete information these mechanisms are outcome
10and pay-o⁄ equivalent.16
Lemma 1 Under complete information, any equilibrium of G entails the allocation fe￿(￿);q￿(￿)g￿2￿.
This result has two simple corollaries. First, both contractual regimes are a Nash equilibrium of
G; second, they yield the same consumers￿surplus, as well as the same level of (total) social welfare.
At more abstract level, this result is similar to Katz (1991) showing that the use of agents in games
does not have e⁄ects on the equilibrium outcome if there exists a contract which perfectly internalizes
the externality between principals and agents. We shall see that this result drastically changes under
asymmetric information and unenforceability of relative performance.
Finally, as for the equilibrium marginal cost, c￿(￿) = ￿￿q￿(￿), one can easily show that it increases
with respect to b in all states. Even if the e⁄ort is set at its ￿rst-best level ￿ there is no x-ine¢ ciency
￿ increasing product market competition weakens the incentive to reduce costs. To be more precise,
when b increases the marginal revenue of each ￿rm decreases, thus determining a reduction of output.
Since production technologies display ￿complementarity￿between e⁄ort and output, more competition
will also call for a reduction of e⁄ort, which in turn raises marginal costs; a scale e⁄ect (see Varian,
1994, and Vives, 2005, among many others).
4 Asymmetric Information
This section introduces asymmetric information. Two main sources of ine¢ ciency are at play under
the two contractual regimes. First, information asymmetries force owners to give up information rents
to managers in order to induce separation of types, a distributive e⁄ect. Second, a rent-extraction e⁄ect
leads the market allocation to be distorted away from its ￿rst-best level. Of course, the magnitude
of these rents will be crucially a⁄ected by the type of mechanism enforced within each competing
hierarchy. These e⁄ects originate from the possibility of dishonest behavior by managers at the
revelation stage, and the pro￿tability of such mimicking behaviors is sensitive to the features of
the observable, costs or pro￿ts, used by a ￿rm owner to foster types￿separation. More speci￿cally,
under cost-target contracts, the possibility of claiming that a high-cost realization is induced by an
16The proof of this result is standard, thus it is omitted.
11unfavorable realization of ￿, whereas it is only due to low e⁄ort, makes e¢ cient managers willing
to mimic ine¢ cient ones at the revelation stage. An analogous force shapes incentives under pro￿t-
target; though, under this regime, a competing-contracts e⁄ect is also at play.17 As we show, while
under a cost-target regime managers enjoy an informational monopoly position at the revelation stage,
conditioning managerial rewards on pro￿ts, allows owners to weaken this position and, in turn, to shape
more e¢ ciently agency costs. In fact, the adoption of a pro￿t-target contract relaxes the revelation
constraint of e¢ cient managers, whereas it tightens that of ine¢ cient ones relative to cost-target.
The section characterizes the pure strategies Nash equilibria of G. After having studied the cases
where owners play symmetrically, it is shown that, for a given range of parameters, both contractual
regimes can emerge as a Nash equilibrium of G. We shall argue that the competing-contracts e⁄ect is
key to this result.
Incentive Feasible Allocations under Cost-Target To begin with, let us consider the maximiza-
tion problem that the i-th owner solves under a cost-target contract. As discussed above, an incentive
feasible allocation must satisfy two requirements: (i) it must induce managers to accept the contract;
and (ii) it must also foster separation of types. Denote ui(￿) = wi(￿) ￿  (ei(￿)) the type-dependent
utility of th i-th manger, and let ￿i(￿) = A ￿ qi(￿) ￿ bqj(￿) ￿ ci(￿) and ei(￿) = ￿ ￿ ci(￿) for all
￿. Formally, the owner-i￿ s optimization problem, Pc
i, is to design a contract, fci(￿);qi(￿);wi(￿)g￿2￿,
so to maximize the expected pro￿ts,
P
￿2￿ Pr(￿)f￿i(￿)qi(￿) ￿  (ei(￿)) ￿ ui(￿)g, subject to incentive
compatibility (IC) and participation constraints (PC):
(PCL) ui(￿L) ￿ 0; (PCH) ui(￿H) ￿ 0; (2)
(ICL) ui(￿L) ￿ ui(￿H) +  (ei(￿H)) ￿  (ei(￿H) ￿ 1); (3)
(ICH) ui(￿H) ￿ ui(￿L) +  (ei(￿L)) ￿  (ei(￿L) + 1); (4)
moreover, the following non-negativity constraints must hold too:
qi(￿) ￿ 0; 0 ￿ ci(￿) ￿ ￿; for every ￿ 2 ￿:
17See Martimort (1996) for a characterization of this e⁄ect in a general set-up also encompassing the case of strategic
complementarity between ￿rms￿actions.
12Notice that, under this contractual mode, product market competition does not play any direct
role on the set of revelation constraints needed for types￿separation. The agency issue within each
vertical organization is isolated from the e⁄ects of market competition, and managers get monopoly
power at the revelation stage.
Incentive Feasible Allocations under Pro￿t-Target We now turn to present the problem under
a pro￿t-target regime. As above, an incentive feasible allocation must satisfy incentive compatibility
and participation constraints for all managers￿types. Let ei(￿) = ￿i(￿) + qi(￿) + bqj(￿) + ￿ ￿ A; the
owner-i￿ s optimization problem, P
p
i , is to design a contract, f￿i(￿);qi(￿);wi(￿)g￿2￿, so to maximize
the expected pro￿ts,
P
￿2￿ Pr(￿)f￿i(￿)qi(￿) ￿  (ei(￿)) ￿ ui(￿)g, subject to incentive compatibility
and participation constraints:
(PCH) ui(￿H) ￿ 0; (PCL) ui(￿L) ￿ 0; (5)
(ICL) ui(￿L) ￿ ui(￿H) +  (ei(￿H)) ￿  (ei(￿H) ￿ 1 + {(qj)); (6)
(ICH) ui(￿H) ￿ ui(￿L) +  (ei(￿L)) ￿  (ei(￿L) + 1 ￿ {(qj)); (7)
where {(qj) = b(qj(￿L) ￿ qj(￿H)) and qj = (qj(￿))￿2￿. Once again, the non-negativity constraints
below must be satis￿ed too:
￿i(￿) ￿ 0; qi(￿) ￿ 0; 0 ￿ ei(￿) ￿ ￿; for every ￿ 2 ￿:
As one can easily observe, the above revelation constraints markedly di⁄er from the ones displayed
in program Pc
i. Only when both ￿rms are monopolistic in their own markets, b = 0, the revelation
constraints are the same under both regimes. The term ￿{(qj) formally captures the competing-
contracts e⁄ect, now at play through ICL and ICH. Crucially, because of types￿perfect correlation,
the pro￿tability of a deviation by the i-th manager at the revelation stage is a⁄ected by the mecha-
nism enforced within the competing hierarchy. In words, managers loose some of the informational
monopoly power they have under cost-target contracts, but not completely as it would happen under
pure relative performance evaluation.
13More formally, if the i-th e¢ cient manager, ￿L, mimics an ine¢ cient one, mi = ￿H, he must exert
an e⁄ort ~ ei(￿H) = ei(￿H)￿1+{(qj) in order to perform the target ￿i(￿H) devised for ine¢ cient types.
Of course, this kind of deviation is pro￿table and provides information rents whenever the competing
structure is very aggressive at the market stage, i.e., {(qj) ￿ 1. When the competing ￿rm is less
aggressive, {(qj) > 1, however, the competing-contracts e⁄ect kills these rents. As one can infer
from ICH, in this case, ine¢ cient types have an incentive to mimic e¢ cient ones and countervailing
incentives obtain (Maggi and Rodriguez, 1995, and Jullien, 2000, among many others). Depending
upon the sign of {(qj)￿1, program P
p
i may then display di⁄erent con￿gurations of binding constraints.
Therefore, cases where ine¢ cient types enjoy positive rents and the allocation assigned to e¢ cient ones
is downward distorted (PCL and ICH bind) cannot be ruled out independently of contracts chosen by
owners. As we will show, when both owners implement pro￿t-target contracts, one gets {(qj) < 1, so
that PCH and ICL bind. Nash equilibrium entails standard downward distortion. E¢ cient managers
enjoy positive rents, while the allocation assigned to ine¢ cient ones is distorted downward relative to
its ￿rst-best level. At the contracting stage, though, unilateral deviations from cost-target may entail
{(qj) ￿ 1 under certain conditions.
4.1 Equilibrium Characterization
This section characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of G. We prove that, beyond having a non-standard
impact on the equilibrium allocation implemented under pro￿t-target, product market competition
also plays an important role in shaping the set of the equilibrium contracts. The symmetric Nash
equilibria of G are characterized in two steps. First, we derive the set of payo⁄s and allocations
obtained when owners play symmetrically, namely either of them play cost-target (pro￿t-target).
Next, a revealed preferences argument (formally developed in the appendix) allows us to derive the
equilibrium contractual modes satisfying De￿nition 1.
Equilibrium Market Allocations under a Cost-Target Regime Assume that both owners
implement cost-target contracts, by applying a standard technique, we ￿rst consider a relaxed opti-
mization program (see Appendix) where only ICL and PCH bind, then we show that all remaining
constraints of Pc
i are indeed satis￿ed at the solution of this program. Assuming interior solutions, one
14can show that the ￿rst-order necessary conditions are:
A ￿ 2qc
i(￿L) ￿ bqj(￿L) ￿ (￿L ￿ ec
i(￿L)) = 0; (8)
qc
i(￿L) ￿ ec
i(￿L) = 0; (9)
A ￿ 2qc
i(￿H) ￿ bqj(￿H) ￿ (￿H ￿ ec
i(￿H)) = 0; (10)
￿(qc
i(￿H) ￿ ec
i(￿H)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) = 0: (11)
Equations (8), (9) and (10) are standard optimality conditions requiring that, in the optimum,
marginal revenues must be equated to marginal costs, exactly as under complete information. The
￿rst-order condition with respect to ci(￿H), equation (11), however, provides the main di⁄erence with
the system of equations yielding the complete-information allocation. The reason for this relies on
a standard rent extraction argument. In order to minimize the rents granted to e¢ cient managers,
owners must distort downward the e⁄ort exerted by ine¢ cient managers relative to its ￿rst-best level.
Observe also that, in this case, the dichotomy result holds (see La⁄ont and Tirole, 1988, Ch. 3).
Speci￿cally, while output is chosen according to the ￿rst best rule, e⁄ort (cost) needs to be distorted
for rent extraction reasons. In a Nash symmetric equilibrium of the market game where both owners
play cost target contract, equations (8)-(11) yield:















Of course, when ￿ ! 1 the optimal contract entails ￿rst-best in both states of nature as only
high-cost managers are present on the market, so that there is no need for distorting allocations.
When ￿ ! 0, instead, the distortion imposed by asymmetric information on high-cost types increases
because the rent-extraction-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄ exacerbates due to the excessive presence of low-cost
15types.
Next lemma shows that program Pc
i is well behaved at fqc(￿);ec(￿);wc(￿)g￿2￿ and that such
allocation displays standard properties of adverse selection models. Let I ￿ (￿H + 3(1 ￿ ￿)=￿;2￿L),
Lemma 2 The allocation fqc(￿);ec(￿);wc(￿)g￿2￿ satis￿es the following properties: (i) ￿rst-order con-
ditions (8)-(11) are necessary and su¢ cient for a unique optimum; (ii) both ICH and PCL hold as
inequalities; (iii) program Pc
i displays interior solutions for A 2 I ; (iv) no distortion at the top and
downward distortion of the ine¢ cient type￿ s allocation.
Since we have assumed ￿L > 1 + 3(1 ￿ ￿)=￿, one can immediately show that I is not empty, so
that interior solutions obtain.
Equilibrium Market Allocations under a Pro￿t-Target Regime Assume, now, that both
owners implement pro￿t-target contracts. As above, we ￿rst consider an auxiliary program (see
Appendix) where only ICL and PCH bind in P
p
i , then we show that at equilibrium, all remaining






i(￿L) = 0; (14)
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i(￿H)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ {(qj)) = 0; (16)
￿(q
p
i (￿H) ￿ e
p
i(￿H)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ {(qj)) = 0: (17)
Once again, from equations (14) and (15) one can see that, at the optimum, marginal revenues
must be equated to marginal costs and that e¢ cient types produce at the complete-information level.
From (16) and (17), however, one can see that ine¢ cient types must produce below the ￿rst-best. Since
￿p(￿) = qp(￿) for all ￿, also in this case the dichotomy result holds. Solving for a Nash symmetric
equilibrium where both owners play pro￿t target contracts, equations (14)-(17) yield:















Again, when ￿ ! 1 the optimal contract entails ￿rst-best in both states of nature. Whereas when
￿ ! 0, the distortion imposed by asymmetric information on high-cost types increases. However, as
we explain in Section 5, because of the competing-contracts e⁄ect the distortion may well decrease
with the degree of products￿di⁄erentiation.
Next lemma ￿nally shows that program P
p
i is well behaved at fqp(￿);￿p(￿);wp(￿)g￿2￿ and that
this allocation also exhibits the standard properties of no distortion at the top, both in e⁄ort and
quantities, and no rents at the bottom.
Lemma 3 The allocation fqp(￿);￿p(￿);wp(￿)g￿2￿ satis￿es the following properties: (i) ￿rst-order
conditions (14)-(17) are necessary and su¢ cient for a unique optimum; (ii) both ICH and PCL hold
as inequalities, i.e., 1 > {(q
p
j); (iii) program P
p
i displays interior solutions for A 2 I; (iv) no
distortion at the top and downward distortion of the ine¢ cient type￿ s allocation.
Once again, as ￿L > 1 + 3(1 ￿ ￿)=￿, one can immediately show that I is not empty, thus interior
solutions obtain.
Equilibrium We now characterize of the set of Nash equilibria of G. To this aim, as a preliminary
result we state and prove the next lemma which provides a useful description of how e⁄orts and
outputs are ordered under both (symmetric) contractual regimes,
Lemma 4 Assume ￿ 2 (0;1], the allocations fqp(￿);ep(￿)g￿2￿ and fqc(￿);ec(￿)g￿2￿ satisfy: (i)
qp(￿L) = qc(￿L) and ep(￿L) = ec(￿L) for all b; (ii) qp(￿H) ￿ qc(￿H) and ep(￿H) ￿ ec(￿H) for all
b; with equality holding only at b = 0.
As we have discussed above, because of the competing-contracts e⁄ect, the incentive for e¢ cient
managers to mimic ine¢ cient ones weakens under a pro￿t-target regime relative to a cost-target one.
To see it formally, let ’(e) =  (e)￿ (e￿1) and #(e) =  (e)￿ (e￿1+{(qj)) denote the information
rents granted by a ￿rm owner to e¢ cient managers under cost-target and pro￿t-target, respectively.
Figure 1 shows that at the e⁄ort level implemented under cost-target, ec(￿H), a pro￿t-target contract
17allows a ￿rm owner to reduce information rents paid-out to e¢ cient types, ’(ec(￿H)) > #(ec(￿H)),
provided that her competitor implements the allocation fqp(￿);￿p(￿)g￿2￿. It is thus pro￿table to
shift upward ep(￿H) towards the complete-information level, so to have e￿(￿H) > ep(￿H) ￿ ec(￿H).
Intuitively, the di⁄erence between cost-target and pro￿t-target contracts hinges on the way they allow
owners to exploit the information disclosed by managers. The revelation of a good state provides two
bits of information to a ￿rm owner: a good news concerning productive e¢ ciency, and a bad news as
for the toughness of market competitors. Cost target contracts only allow owners to exploit the former
piece of information since, under this contractual mode, competition at the market stage cannot be
fed in the reward structure, leaving managers with informational monopoly power at the revelation
stage. Pro￿t target, instead, provides the owner with ￿ exibility in adjusting managerial rewards to
the underlying competitive environment, thus exerting downward pressures on managerial slack and
alleviating x-ine¢ ciency. Interestingly, this result ￿ts the evidence showing that contracts based on










Figure 1: Information Rents under both Contracts.
Next proposition studies how these features a⁄ect pro￿ts and the characterization of the equi-
librium contractual choices. To keep things tractable we focus on symmetric equilibria of G. The
possibility of asymmetric equilibria, and their implications on the qualitative results of the paper, are
discussed in a concluding section. Of course, when ￿ ! f0;1g it is likely that both types of contracts
emerge in a symmetric equilibrium of G, since in these case one gets shut down or ￿rst-best under both
18See Knittel (2002) and Cuæat and Guadalupe (2004) among many others.
18regimes. The same holds for b ! 0 since when produced goods are not di⁄erentiated at all ￿rms are
monopolists on their own market. To make things interesting, in what follows we will thus consider
only cases where ￿ 2 (0;1) and b > 0.
To begin with, it will be convenient to de￿ne:
￿ ￿
￿
(￿;b) 2 (0;1) ￿ (0;1] : 0 < ￿ < 1=2, b￿




￿ = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿), and denote by ￿c its complement,
Proposition 1 G displays the following properties: (i) it has a unique symmetric equilibrium where
both owners play a pro￿t-target contract whenever (￿;b) 2 ￿c; (ii) it has two symmetric equilibria
where both types of contracts are played whenever (￿;b) 2 ￿.
The proposition shows that pro￿t-target contracts are always an equilibrium of the game whereas
cost-target contracts may be only if product market competition is ￿erce enough, b ￿ b￿
￿, and ine¢ cient
managers are relatively less likely than e¢ cient ones, ￿ ￿ 0:5.
The intuition for the result is easily provided and deserves a discussion. Consider pro￿t target
as a candidate symmetric equilibrium strategy pro￿le. An incentive feasible deviation to cost target
would force a ￿rm owner to induce her ine¢ cient manager to behave less aggressively at the market
stage, by implementing a lower e⁄ort relative to that implemented under pro￿t-target, at the cost
of increasing information rents granted to the e¢ cient manager. This course of action is, obviously,
always unpro￿table since it entails both a weaker market position and larger agency costs relative to
pro￿t target.
The rationale for why cost-target contracts may survive under certain parameter con￿guration as
an equilibrium of G can be easily described too. Assume a cost target contract as a candidate sym-
metric Nash equilibrium strategy pro￿le of G. Consider now an incentive feasible deviation to a pro￿t
target contract. Remember that incentive compatibility under pro￿t target may entail countervailing
incentives depending on the size of {(:) in program P
p
i , evaluated at the allocation played by the com-
petitor in the candidate equilibrium, qc. Whenever (￿;b) 2 ￿ , i.e., if competition is su¢ ciently ￿erce
and the likelihood of high cost states is su¢ ciently large, one can easily check that an incentive feasible
19deviation indeed entails countervailing incentives. In this case, however, deviation to a pro￿t target
contract is never worthwhile. The reason is that, in the deviation, incentive compatibility requires
increasing the quantity-e⁄ort pair played by the manager in the bad state (high-cost) and decreasing
them in the good state (low-cost) for rent extraction reasons. But, deviating to a weaker competitive
stance in the good state and to a tougher one in the bad one would not be pro￿table whenever the bad
state is unlikely and competition is strong enough. Figure 2 below graphs the equilibrium contract in
the square [0;1]2.
The white area in ￿gure 2 below, ￿c, denotes the region where G displays a unique Nash equilibrium















Figure 2: Equilibrium Contracts in the Square [0;1]2.
Proposition 1 establishes that competition plays a crucial role in determining the features of the
equilibrium contracts in economies where ine¢ cient managers are relatively less likely than e¢ cient
ones. Remarkably, a negative relationship between product market competition and the e¢ ciency
properties of ￿rms￿competitive strategies obtains in this case. When products are relatively close
substitutes, owners may end up playing cost-based contracts and implement a market allocation less
competitive than that achieved under pro￿t-target. This is the most important result of our model
and, interestingly, it provides to some extent a theoretical explanation for the evidence that di⁄erent
executive compensation structures are used in di⁄erent countries. For instance, Murphy (1999) reports
that US executives receive a larger fraction of their compensation in the form of stock options than any
20of their global counterparts and that stock options are completely absent in 9 out of the 23 countries
surveyed in the Worldwide Total Remuneration Report.
>From a policy perspective, it is ￿nally worth noticing that the e⁄ects on total welfare and
consumers￿surplus of the two types of contracts analyzed above are quite di⁄erent. Next corollary
summarizes the result.
Corollary 1 For all pairs (￿;b) 2 (0;1) ￿ (0;1] cost-target contracts are detrimental to total welfare
and consumers￿ surplus relative to pro￿t-target. Of course, for b = 0 and ￿ = 1 they are welfare
equivalent.
This result opens a number of policy issues related to the welfare e⁄ects of equilibrium organiza-
tional modes. In particular, an immediate normative implication of our analysis is that an antitrust
authority concerned with the e¢ ciency properties of di⁄erent forms of vertical control in managerial
￿rms, should carefully assess the welfare properties of reward schemes based on costs. 19
5 X-Ine¢ ciency
Our model has two major implications on the relationship between x-ine¢ ciency and competitive
pressure. First, as showed in Lemma 4, the equilibrium e⁄ort level implemented under a pro￿t-target
regime is larger than that obtained under cost-target contracts, which, however, may well be an
equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, under pro￿t-target a new channel through which increasing
product market competition in￿ uences managerial e⁄ort emerges.
Of course, when incentives are provided via costs there exists a negative relationship between
competition and x-e¢ ciency due to a standard scale e⁄ect at play through marginal revenues, that is
@ec(￿)=@b < 0 for all ￿. In fact, as the revelation constraints imposed by asymmetric information on
the e¢ ciency frontier of each organization are not (directly) a⁄ected by b, and pro￿ts display com-
plementarities between output and e⁄ort, more ￿erce product market competition a⁄ects negatively
the equilibrium e⁄ort level only via marginal revenues. The same holds under a pro￿t-target regime,
but only for e¢ cient managers producing at the complete-information level. As for ine¢ cient types,
19Similarly, after periods of liberalization reforms aimed at relaxing competition, policy makers should regard as
sub-optimal any attempt to coordinate on cost-based contractual regimes.
21instead, product market competition may well have a positive impact on e⁄ort via a pure agency
e⁄ect driven by competing-contracts. Of course, the tension between the e⁄ects discussed above plays
a crucial role in determining the relationship between industry costs and product market competition.





(1 + b)2 +
2 ￿ ￿
(￿ + b)2: (20)
The ￿rst term in equation (20) captures the scale e⁄ect and is negative, the second one is positive
and stands for the pure agency e⁄ect. Intuitively, when products become more close substitutes,
e⁄ort reduces simply because production is less pro￿table. Nonetheless, an increase in b reduces the
information rents granted to e¢ cient types thus allowing owners to increase the e⁄ort exerted by
ine¢ cient managers, everything else being kept constant.20 Of course, the net e⁄ect will depend on:
(i) the intensity of product market competition, measured by the degree of products￿substitutability,
b; (ii) the relative likelihood of ine¢ cient managers, ￿; and (iii) the measure of the market pro￿tability,
A ￿ ￿L. Next proposition formalizes the result:
Proposition 2 Assume cp(￿H) > 0 and take any ￿ 2 (0;1),then there exists ￿ k￿ > 0 such that: (i)
if A ￿ ￿L < ￿ k￿, ep(￿H) is inverted-U shaped, i.e., it is strictly concave in b with a maximum at
￿ b￿ 2 [0;1); (ii) if A￿￿L ￿ ￿ k￿; ep(￿H) is monotonically decreasing in b; (iii) ￿ k￿1 ￿ ￿ k￿2 for all ￿1 ￿ ￿2:
The intuition for the result is easily provided. From equation (20) one can see that the relative
magnitude of the scale e⁄ect is larger if the market pro￿tability increases. In fact, when there are few
rents to be shared out from the market, i.e., A￿￿L low, more competition may lead ￿rms￿owners to
increase the e⁄ort exerted by ine¢ cient mangers. When the market is pro￿table enough, i.e., A ￿ ￿L
large, this e⁄ect weakens and the scale e⁄ect always overcomes the pure agency e⁄ect. Of course, in the
former case, the relative magnitude of the scale e⁄ect is increasing with b, meaning that the incentive
to reduce costs is strong when competition is su¢ ciently weak. Finally, as stated in part (iii), it is
also worth noticing that the relative magnitude of the pure agency e⁄ect is decreasing in the measure
of ine¢ cient managers in the economy. Intuitively, when unfavorable realizations of the production
20This can be seen more formally from ICL in program P
p
i .
22technology are relatively more likely than favorable ones, owners do not need to distort much the e⁄ort
exerted by ine¢ cient managers from the ￿rst-best level in order to separate types, thus weakening
the competing-contracts e⁄ect. Interestingly, the result seems to capture the evidence produced in
Aghion et al. (2005) showing the existence of an inverted-U shaped relationship between competition
and innovation in the U. K. industries during the period of liberalization reforms undertaken over the
1970s and 1980s.
One can also show that the e⁄ect characterized above may be so strong to drive expected costs
at industry level to assume a U-shaped form. Let ￿ ￿ = ￿￿H + (1 ￿ ￿)￿L, ￿ ep =
P
￿2￿ Pr(￿)ep(￿) and
￿ cp = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ep. Next proposition provides conditions under which ￿ cp is also non-monotonic with respect
to b.
Corollary 2 Assume cp(￿H) > 0 and take any ￿ 2 (0;1), then there exists a positive number ^ k￿ < ￿ k￿
such that: (i) if A￿￿L < ^ k￿; ￿ cp is U-shaped, i.e., it is strictly convex in b with a minimum at ^ b￿ ￿ ￿ b￿;
(ii) if A ￿ ￿L > ^ k￿, ￿ cp is monotonically increasing in b; (iii) ^ k￿1 ￿ ^ k￿2 for all ￿1 ￿ ￿2.
The economic interpretation for this result is similar to the one we have provided for Proposition
2 above, thus it will be omitted.
Finally, next proposition shows that while information rents are decreasing with respect to b under
a cost-target regime, they may well follow an inverted-U shaped relationship under pro￿t-target.
Proposition 3 The information rents ’(ec(￿H)) and #(ep(￿H)) satisfy the following properties: (i)
’(ec(￿H)) is monotonically decreasing in b; (ii) for any given ￿ 2 (0;1) there exists ￿ k￿ > 0 such that:
if A ￿ ￿L < ￿ k￿ then #(ep(￿H)) is inverted-U shaped, i.e., it is strictly concave in b; with a maximum
at ￿ b￿ 2 [0;1); if A ￿ ￿L ￿ ￿ k￿, then #(ep(￿H)) is monotonically decreasing in b; (iii) ￿ k￿1 ￿ ￿ k￿2 for all
￿1 ￿ ￿2.
The economic intuition for part (i) is straightforward. As we have seen before, the e⁄ort level
exerted by ine¢ cient managers under cost-target decreases with b, information rents must then follow
the same pattern since they increase with respect to e⁄ort. As for part (ii), one must consider two
e⁄ects. First, as above, b has an indirect impact via e⁄ort. Second, information rents may also vary
because of the competing-contracts e⁄ect. While the former e⁄ect may be ambiguous depending on
23the conditions provided in Proposition 2, one can easily verify that the latter one goes in the direction
of reducing information rents.
6 Discussion
Throughout the paper we made two main simplifying assumptions. First, the analysis has been carried
out under the assumption of discrete types. Second, we assumed perfect (positive) correlation between
managers￿types. Moreover, we have focused only on symmetric equilibria. As we now explain, the
results of the paper can be generalized by relaxing both these assumptions.
Continuum of Types Introducing a continuum of types does not change qualitatively our results,
though it notably complicates their formal derivation.21 In fact, the driving force of our results,
a competing-contracts e⁄ect emerging under pro￿t-target contracts, would still be at play with a
compact support of types.22 In this case, however, to obtain tractable close form solutions, one should
impose quite restrictive assumptions on the distribution of types. Hence, besides adding unnecessary
analytical complications, such restrictions would also weaken the robustness of the analysis.
Correlated Types When relative performance are unenforceable, introducing correlated types does
not qualitatively change our results provided that the correlation between managers￿types is positive
and su¢ ciently large. The proof of this claim is based on a simple continuity argument holding for the




i would display objective functions, revelation and participation constraints continuous in
the measure of correlation.
Asymmetric Equilibria Throughout the paper we have studied only symmetric equilibria of the
game G. One may wonder whether, besides the results characterized in Proposition 1, there exist
some asymmetric equilibria where owners end up playing di⁄erent types of contracts. We believe
that, although from a purely theoretical viewpoint the question is per se an interesting one23, it would
not add new qualitative insights to the results already stated in the paper. Indeed the presence of
21Especially for what concerns the proof of Proposition 1 which is a central result of the paper.
22This can be readily showed by adapting the formal analysis performed in Martimort (1996) to our framework
including a moral hazard component.
23It is possible to show that, under some con￿guration of the parameters of the model, asymmetric equilibria may
indeed exist.
24asymmetric equilibria would only reinforce the ￿nding that the observed heterogeneity of governance
arrangements in managerial ￿rms can be rationalized by agency theory in a competing organization
set-up with unobservable contracts.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed the relationship between managerial incentives and product market competition
in a principal-agent perspective. The analysis has considered an environment where ￿rm owners
endogenously design the type of contractual arrangements determining the organization structure of
their ￿rms. Under adverse selection and moral hazard, owners are asked to choose between cost-based
and pro￿t-based managerial rewards in order to shape the rent extraction-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄. Two
assumptions are key to our results: (i) common components in the managers￿private information; (ii)
inability to enforce relative performance schemes.
In characterizing the set of equilibrium contracts, we have proved that this set is non trivially
a⁄ected by the degree of product market competition. It is shown that pro￿t-target contracts are
always a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game, whereas cost-target contracts (whose study has
been often the focus of the literature on optimal managerial contracts) may only be when the degree of
product market competition is large enough and favorable realization of the production technologies
are relatively more likely than unfavorable ones. This result is important for two main reasons: (i)
it shows that the analysis of the relationship between competition and incentives focused on cost-
target contracts (see Raith, 2003, Schmidt, 1997, Stennek, 2000) overlooks important e⁄ects since
pro￿t-target and cost-target contracts have di⁄erent implications for the equilibrium allocation in
imperfectly competitive industries; (ii) it shows that the principal-agent paradigm is not at odds with
the evidence that managerial rewards are often not based on ￿rms￿performance. In this respect,
one could argue that public policies a⁄ecting the relative cost of alternative contracting regimes can
have signi￿cant impact on owners￿equilibrium incentives and, in turn, on social welfare. In a simple
extension of the present model, where veri￿ability of di⁄erent pieces of information may only be
obtained at a positive ￿xed cost, any policy enhancing transparency of accounting pro￿ts relative to
operation costs may drive shareholders to select the constrained Pareto optimal remuneration scheme.
25We have also argued that when owners choose to condition managerial compensation on costs,
a direct measure of managers￿e⁄ort, the standard inverse relationship between market competition
and e⁄ort obtains. If, instead, owners adopt compensation schemes based on pro￿ts, a contracting
externality directly a⁄ects the revelation constraints needed to guarantee truthful revelation of types.
In this latter case, a competing-contracts e⁄ect ￿ la Martimort (1996) changes owners￿view of the
trade o⁄between rent extraction and e¢ ciency, relative to cost-target contracts, requiring larger e⁄ort
and production levels assigned to ine¢ cient managers, a view which has been recently supported by
U. K. data.
Of course, the results in the paper are subject to few caveats, since they where derived for a simple
contract set available to owners (either cost or pro￿t target have to be chosen). Further investigations
on the robustness of our results for richer contract space available to owners may be worth doing.
However, to the extent that the competing-contracts e⁄ect survives in imperfectly competitive envi-
ronments, we believe that the basic points extend to more general contracting technologies, provided
that yardstick competition is not enforceable.
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8 Appendix
Incentive Feasible Allocations under Cost-Target
Standard algebraic manipulations yield (2)-(4). By adding up ICL and ICH, one can verify that
any allocation which satis￿es simultaneously (3) and (4) must also satisfy the monotonicity condition
1 ￿ ei(￿H) ￿ ei(￿L). So that, whenever one of the two incentive compatibility constraints holds as an
equality and the above inequality is satis￿ed too, it is immediate to show that the other IC constraint
29must hold too. The i-th owner chooses a contract so to maximize the following maximization program:
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
max
hci(:);qi(:);ui(:)i￿2￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)’(ei(￿H)) +
P
￿2￿ Pr(￿)f￿i(￿)qi(￿) ￿  (ei(￿))g
s:t:; qi(￿) ￿ 0, 0 ￿ ci(￿) ￿ ￿; for every ￿ 2 ￿;
(21)
whose ￿rst-order conditions yield immediately ￿rst-order conditions (8)-(11). Since ICL and PCH
together imply PCL, the solution of (21) also optimizes program Pc
i if ICH holds at the equilibrium
allocation.
Proof of Lemma 2
Part (i) The claim easily follows by linearity of both pi(:) and C(:), and convexity of  (:).
Part (ii) PCL is satis￿ed by construction at the allocation fqc(￿);ec(￿)g￿2￿. In order to show
that ICH holds it su¢ ces to verify that 1 ￿ ec(￿H) ￿ ec(￿L). Using equation (12) the proof follows.
Part (iii) First, note that A > ￿H + 3(1 ￿ ￿)=￿ ) ec(￿H) > 0 for all b, which in turn implies
qc(￿H) > 0 since 0 < ec(￿H) < qc(￿H) for all b. Moreover, to have cc(￿) > 0 one also needs ec(￿) < ￿
for all b and ￿, which immediately follows as we have assumed A < 2￿L. Finally, observe that
￿L > 1 + 3(1 ￿ ￿)=￿ implies I 6= ?.
Part (iv) The claim follows by using (1), (12) and (13) together. ￿
Incentive Feasible Allocations under Pro￿t-Target










 00(t + s ￿ A)dtds
by adding up ICL and ICH we get a modi￿ed monotonicity condition:
1 T {(qj) and ￿i(￿L) + qi(￿L) T ￿i(￿H) + qi(￿H): (22)
Once again, if an allocation satis￿es one of the two incentive compatibility constraints with equality
and (22), then also the other IC constraint must be satis￿ed. The i-th owner chooses a mechanism so
30to maximize the following maximization program:
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
max
h￿i(:);qi(:);ui(:)i￿2￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)#(ei(￿H)) +
P
￿2￿ Pr(￿)f￿i(￿)qi(￿) ￿  (ei(￿))g
s:t:; qi(￿) ￿ 0, ￿i(￿) ￿ , 0 ￿ ei(￿) ￿ ￿; for every ￿ 2 ￿;
(23)
whose ￿rst-order conditions immediately yield ￿rst-order conditions (14)-(17). One can note that, by
conjecturing 1 ￿ {(q
p
j) at the equilibrium allocation, PCH and ICL together imply PCL. Hence, in
order to show that the solution of (23) also optimizes program P
p
i , one only needs to show that ICH
is satis￿ed at the equilibrium allocation.
Proof of Lemma 3
Part (i) The proof immediately follows by the linearity of ￿q and convexity of  (:).
Part (ii) PCL holds by construction at the equilibrium allocation. Moreover, to show that ICH
holds too, it is enough checking that the pair (qp(￿L);qp(￿H)) satis￿es (22). Let ￿(qj) ￿ 1￿{(qj), since
qp(￿L) > qp(￿H), equation (22) holds if ￿(qp) ￿ 0 for all b: Simple algebra allows, indeed, to show
that ￿(qp) = ￿=(b + ￿) > 0, which proves the claim.
Part (iii) The proof follows immediately since by Corollary 4 a su¢ cient condition for P
p
i to
display interior solutions is that qc(￿H) > 0 and ec(￿H) > 0 for all b.
Part (iv) Equations (1), (18) and (19) together immediately imply the claim. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4
The proof of part (i) is straightforward. Moreover, since we have assumed internal solutions, by
using (12), (13), (18) and (19) simple algebraic manipulations yield:
qp(￿H) ￿ qc(￿H) =
b(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(￿ + b)(1 + b)
￿ 0; ep(￿H) ￿ ec(￿H) =
b(1 ￿ ￿)(2 + b)
￿(￿ + b)(1 + b)
￿ 0; (24)
which immediately proves part (ii). ￿
Proof of Proposition 1
To begin with, it is worthwhile observing that the maximization programs solved by the i-th owner
under the two types of contracts can be rewritten as:
31Cost-Target:
8
> > > > > <




￿2￿ Pr(￿)f(pi(qi(￿);qj(￿)) ￿ (￿ ￿ ei(￿)))qi(￿) ￿  (ei(￿)) ￿ ui(￿)g




> > > > > <




￿2￿ Pr(￿)f(pi(qi(￿);qj(￿)) ￿ (￿ ￿ ei(￿)))qi(￿) ￿  (ei(￿)) ￿ ui(￿)g
s:t:; (5) ￿ (7), qi(￿) ￿ 0, ￿i(￿) ￿ , 0 ￿ ei(￿) ￿ ￿; for every ￿ 2 ￿:
(26)
Notice that, for any given pair (qj(￿L);qj(￿H)), programs (25) and (26) display the same objective
function but di⁄erent sets of constraints. Hence we can use a simple revealed preferences argument
to show that if the allocation solving program (26) is feasible in (25), i.e., it satis￿es (2)-(4), then the
i-the owner must be better o⁄ under cost-target relative to pro￿t-target (the converse is obviously
also true).
Part (i) The claim is proved in three steps.
Step 1 Pro￿t-target must be a symmetric equilibrium of the game G for all (b;￿) 2 [0;1]2.
Proof In order to prove the claim we need to show that the allocation implemented by the i-
th owner under cost-target is incentive feasible under pro￿t-target, conditional on her rival playing
pro￿t-target. Let qj(￿) = qp(￿), ej(￿) = ep(￿) for all ￿, by using (8)-(11) one can show that the
optimal (deviation) allocation under cost-target for the i-th owner entails ￿rst-best in the low-cost
state. qd
i (￿L) = ed
i(￿L) = q￿(￿L). Moreover, in an (interior) incentive feasible solution, in the high-cost
state one gets:
qd




￿ + (1 + b)b







where one can easily show that monotonicity conditions hold at this allocation so that types separation
is guaranteed. In order to complete the step we need to show that this allocation satis￿es (22),
32meaning that both inequalities: 1 ￿ {(q
p
j) ￿ 0 and q￿(￿L) ￿ qd
i (￿H) must hold. Suppose that
0 < ed
i(￿H) < ￿H for some pairs (b;￿) 2 B with B ￿ [0;1]2. First, note that as ￿ + (1 + b)b > 0,
it follows that qd
i (￿H) < q￿(￿H) < q￿(￿L) for all b. Then, observe that 1 ￿ {(q
p
j) = ￿=(￿ + b) > 0.
The same holds immediately with corner solutions, i.e., ed
i(￿H) = ￿H or ed
i(￿H) = 0 for some pairs
(b;￿) 2 ￿ B with B [ ￿ B = [0;1]2 and B \ ￿ B = ?.
A simple revealed preferences argument, ￿nally, allows to show that pro￿t-target is always an
equilibrium of the game and concludes the step.
Step 2 Pro￿t-target is always a pro￿table deviation for the i-the owner whenever ￿ ￿ 1=2, condi-
tional on her rivals playing the (equilibrium) allocation obtained under a cost-target regime.
Proof We use the same logic as above. Let qj(￿) = qc(￿) and ej(￿) = ec(￿) for all ￿. The
claim can be showed if the i-th owner has an incentive to play pro￿t-target for all b whenever ￿ ￿
1=2. It is then enough arguing that the allocation obtained when both owners play cost-target,
fec(￿);qc(￿);wc(￿)g￿2￿, satis￿es condition (22). So the following properties must hold: 1￿{(qc
j) ￿ 0
and qc(￿L) > qc(￿H) for every b 2 [0;1]. The latter inequality is obviously true; the former one rewrites
as 0 ￿ 1 ￿ b=(1 + b)￿ which holds for all b ￿ ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) = b￿
￿. Moreover, since ￿ ￿ 1=2 it follows
that b￿
￿ ￿ 1, hence b ￿ b￿
￿ holds for every b 2 [0;1]. A simple revealed preferences argument allows to
conclude the step.
Step 3 Assume ￿ < 1=2, then deviating to pro￿t-target is individually pro￿table for the i-th
owner for all b ￿ b￿
￿, provided that her competitor plays the (equilibrium) allocation obtained under
cost-target.
Proof First, observe that ￿ < 1=2 ) 0 ￿ b￿
￿ < 1. As demonstrated above, at qj(￿) = qc(￿) and
ej(￿) = ec(￿) for all ￿, the i-th owner has an incentive to play pro￿t-target for b ￿ b￿
￿:
Finally, gathering steps 1, 2 and 3 the claim follows immediately. ￿
Part (ii) Since in part (i) we have proved that pro￿t-target is always an equilibrium of G, we
now demonstrate that cost-target is also an equilibrium of G for all (b;￿) 2 ￿. Two simple steps
demonstrate the claim.
Step 1 Cost-target contracts are an equilibrium of G when the following properties hold: (i) b > b￿
￿
33and ￿ 2 [1=3;1=2]; (ii) b 2 (b￿
￿;2b￿
￿] and 0 < ￿ < 1=3.
Proof We now need to demonstrate that the (deviation) allocation obtained under pro￿t-target
for the i-th owner is incentive feasible under cost-target, provided that her rival plays the (equilibrium)
allocation obtained under a cost-target regime. To do so, we ￿rst need to characterize the (deviation)
allocation played by the i-th owner under pro￿t-target when qj(￿) = qc(￿) and ej(￿) = ec(￿) for all ￿.
Notice that when b > b￿
￿ the optimal deviation entails countervailing incentives since 1 ￿ {(qc
j) < 0.
One can see that ICH and PCL bind, while ICL and PCH are slack in program P
p
i , so that the high-
cost type is now earning information rents. The i-th owner must design a contract so to optimize the
following (relaxed) maximization program:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
maxh￿i(:);qi(:);ui(:)i￿2￿
P
￿2￿ Pr(￿)f￿i(￿)qi(￿) ￿  (ei(￿)) ￿ ui(￿)g
s:t:; ICH and PCL , qi(￿) ￿ 0, ￿i(￿) ￿ , 0 ￿ ei(￿) ￿ ￿ for every ￿ 2 ￿;
(27)
where constraints ICH and PCL are those displayed in program P
p
i and the former one must be







￿2￿ be the solution of (27). Assuming
interior solutions, standard optimization techniques yield:
qD
i (￿H) = eD




























Of course, this allocation satis￿es incentive compatibility and participation constraints by construc-
tion since one can check that qD
i (￿L) < qD
i (￿H) under the restrictions imposed in the paper. The step







￿2￿ satis￿es the monotonic-
ity condition under cost-target. After some algebraic manipulations one gets 1 ￿ (eD
i (￿H) ￿ eD
i (￿L))
if b ￿ 2b￿
￿. This immediately proves the claim for ￿ 2 [1=3;1=2] as ￿ ￿ 1=3 ) 2b￿







if ￿ < 1=3.
Step 2 Cost-target is an equilibrium when 0 < ￿ < 1=3 and b 2 (2b￿
￿;1].




i denote the di⁄erence between the expected pro￿ts accruing
34to the i-th owner at the candidate equilibrium and when she deviates to pro￿t-target, respectively.
Observe that, for any given ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿￿i(b;￿) is a continuos function of b since we have showed that
programs Pc
i and (27) display interior solutions. After some algebraic manipulations we obtain:
￿￿i(b;￿) =
F(b;￿)
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + b)2;
where F(b;￿) ￿ ￿2 + b2(1 ￿ ￿)2 + ￿(3 + 2(1 ￿ ￿)(A ￿ ￿L) + ￿) ￿ 2b(1 ￿ ￿2). It follows then that
sign(￿￿i(b;￿)) = ￿sign(F(b;￿)) since (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + b)2￿ > 0 for all pairs (b;￿). By step 2 we know






and 0 < ￿ < 1=3, it must be then F(b;￿) ￿ 0 at b = 2b￿
￿. Next,
observe that for ￿ < 1=3 the function F(:; ￿ ￿) is strictly convex for any ￿xed ￿ ￿ and displays a global
minimum at bm = (1￿￿2)=(1￿￿)2 ￿ 1, by a continuity argument it then follows that sign(F(b;￿)) =
sign(F(2b￿
￿;￿)) for all b ￿ bm. The proof is completed since F(2b￿
￿;￿) ￿ 0 ) ￿￿i(b;￿) ￿ 0 for all
b ￿ 1.
Gathering steps 1 and 2, the claim follows immediately. ￿
Proof of Corollary 1
To begin with, notice that we have considered a simple representative consumer economy where,
for any given wealth level !, inverse demand functions obtain by the solution of program,
max
(qi;qj;I)
fV (q;I;￿) : pq + I ￿ !g;
with q = (qi;qj), p = (pi;pj) and:









So, let V t(￿) = V (qt(￿);! ￿ pt(￿)qt(￿);￿) de￿ne the measure of the state contingent consumers￿
well being in any symmetric play of G where both owners implement the contractual regime Ct 2 S.
Then after simple manipulations we have:
V t;t(￿) = 2￿qt(￿) ￿ (1 ￿ b)qt(￿)2 + ! ￿ 2pt(￿)qt(￿) = qt(￿)2; for every t 2 fp;cg; ￿ 2 ￿.
35Hence, by using Corollary 4 it is easy to verify that V p;p(￿) ￿ V c;c(￿) for all b. Taking expectations
on both sides one immediately shows the ￿rst part of the claim.
Next, let ut;t(￿) the information rents accruing to each manager￿ s type in a contractual regime









+ ￿t;t(￿) + ut;t(￿)
￿!
;
the expected total welfare in each market, with ￿W = Wp;p ￿ Wc;c, one can easily show that:
sign(￿W) = sign[3(qp(￿H))2 ￿  (ep(￿H)) ￿ (3(qc(￿H))2 ￿  (ec(￿H)))]:
By using equations (11), (17), and (24) together,
￿W =
b(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(￿ + b)(1 + b)
￿








the result then follows from (28) since b ￿ 1 and qp(￿H) + qc(￿H) > 0. Finally, notice that for b = 0
one immediately has ￿W = 0 and V p(￿) = V c(￿) for all ￿, hence the result. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i) By using equation (20) one can show that @ep(￿H)=@b T 0 rewrites as:
(2 ￿ ￿)(1 + b)2
(￿ + b)2 T A ￿ ￿L:
Denote g(b;￿) the left-hand-side of the above equation, simple algebra allows to obtain: g(0;￿) =
2￿￿






(￿+b)3 < 0 for all b. Then, as g(0;￿) > g(1;￿) > 0 for
every ￿ 2 (0;1) and A < ￿L+g(0;￿), there must exist a threshold ￿ b￿ 2 [0;1] such that @ep(￿H)=@b T 0
if b S ￿ b￿. Hence, setting ￿ k￿ = g(0;￿) provides the result.
Observe also that A < ￿L + ￿ k￿ is not incompatible with the requirement of interior solutions,
i.e., A > ￿H +
3(1￿￿)
￿ . Indeed, one can easily show that ￿L + ￿ k￿ > ￿H +
3(1￿￿)
￿ so that the range
[￿H +
3(1￿￿)
￿ ;￿L + ￿ k￿] where the result applies is not empty. Finally, the proof of part (ii) follows
immediately from the argument used above, so it is omitted; while part (iii) is readily proved since
36￿ k￿ = g(0;￿) and @g(0;￿)=@￿ < 0 for all ￿. ￿
Proof of Corollary 2
Part (i) By using equation (20) and the de￿nition of ￿ ep, after some algebraic manipulations, one
can show that @￿ ep=@b T 0 rewrites as:
A ￿ ￿L S ￿(1 + b)2 ￿
b(1 + b)2(2 + b)




Let f(b;￿) denote the right-hand-side of the above inequality, simple algebraic manipulations
allow to show that f(0;￿) =
2￿￿
￿ and f(1;￿) =
4(2￿￿)￿
(1+￿)2 with f(0;￿) > f(1;￿) > 0 for all ￿. Let





(￿ + b)2 ￿ 0; 8 (b;￿) 2 [0;1]2:
Indeed, it is immediate to verify that: (i) if ￿ ￿ 1=3 it follows immediately that ￿(b;￿) ￿ 0 for
(b;￿) 2 [0;1]







￿(b;￿) = ￿2￿(1 + ￿) ￿ 0 )
@f(b;￿)
@b
￿ 0; 8 (b;￿) 2 [0;1]2;
setting ^ k￿ =
2￿￿
￿ the result follows immediately because ^ k￿ ￿ ￿ k￿. Finally, the proof of part (ii) follows
immediately from the argument used above, so it is omitted; while part (iii) is readily proved since
^ k￿ = f(0;￿) and @f(0;￿)=@￿ < 0 for all ￿. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i) Total di⁄erentiation of ’(ec(￿H)) with respect to b yields @’(ec(￿H))=@b = @ec(￿H)=@b,
which immediately yields the result.


















37straightforward algebraic manipulations allow then to show that:
@#(ep(￿H))
@b
T 0 i⁄ A ￿ ￿L S
2(1 + b)2
(￿ + b)(1 + ￿ + 2b)
+
1 + b
1 + ￿ + 2b
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + b)(2 + b)
(￿ + b)(1 + ￿ + 2b)
Next, denote by h(b;￿) the right hand side of the above equation, observe that h(0;￿) > h(1;￿) > 0
for all ￿ 2 (0;1); moreover, one can show that @h(b;￿)=@b ￿ 0 for all pairs (b;￿) since each addendum
in h(b;￿) decreases with respect to b. Letting ￿ k￿ = h(0;￿) the proof can be completed following the
same logic used in the proof of Proposition 2. Finally, the proof of Part (iii) follows since ￿ k￿ = h(0;￿)
and @￿ k￿=@￿ = @h(0;￿)=@￿ < 0: ￿
38